Mr. President, let me

begin by thanking the distinguished

Senator from West Virginia for allowing

me to go first. Mr. President, the

reason I didn’t say anything initially is

because I hoped to be able to still make

my commitment in Delaware and hear

the Senator from West Virginia. I

mean that sincerely. It is rare for the

Senator from West Virginia ever to

take the floor if he does not have a serious

piece of business to conduct. He

is going to speak on the same subject I

am speaking to. I will not get to hear

his speech, but I am sure I will read it

in the RECORD.

Mr. President, I had originally intended

today to introduce a resolution

authorizing United States airstrikes

against Yugoslavia in connection with

the Kosovo crisis because I believe our

Constitution requires the President to

come to us for that authority. I have

decided, however, not to offer the resolution

because of recent developments,

not on the constitutional front, but recent

developments on the ground. The

reality is that we are about to go out of

session, and my ability to get a vote on

this issue is problematic, at best.

Instead, I rise to discuss the implications

for U.S. policy regarding the

agreement on Kosovo worked out 2

days ago by Ambassador Richard

Holbrooke with Yugoslav President

Slobodan Milosevic, after more than a

week of intensive negotiations.

I might note that it seems at every

important point in our history we have

diplomats and elected officials who rise

to the occasion to meet the needs of

the Nation. I would like to suggest

that Richard Holbrooke is the right

man, at the right time, at the right

spot. I compliment him. We are fortunate

to have his diplomatic skills

available to this Nation at this moment.

On Monday, NATO’s 16 member nations

voted unanimously for what they

call an ACTORD. That is military terminology

for an activation order,

which allowed the Supreme Allied

Commander in Europe, U.S. General

Wes Clark, to order airstrikes, which

reportedly would begin with cruise

missiles and escalate to a phased

bombing campaign that would move

beyond Kosovo.

Because this action order was taken,

I believe, and only because of this, our

negotiator, Mr. Holbrooke, was able to

get an agreement from Mr. Milosevic,

the criminal President of the Republic

of Yugoslavia, to agree to certain of

NATO’s demands. In response, the alliance

has postponed launching the airstrikes,

which have been authorized for

4 days, in order to assess whether or

not he, Mr. Milosevic, will comply. I

assure you that he will not comply if

he believes we are not serious about

using significant force. The cruise missiles

are now on immediate standby; B–

52s stand ready on the runway equipped

with cruise missiles to move if

Milosevic fails to meet his commitments.

The cruise missiles are now in

immediate standby until Friday

evening, U.S. eastern daylight time.

In addition, more than 400 allied aircraft,

the majority of them American,

remain available for a phased air campaign,

should that later become necessary.

Mr. President, let me give my assessment

right up front. As I said, I believe

that Ambassador Holbrooke has done a

good job. The agreement he negotiated

in Belgrade is a good one, as long as we

can be sure that if Milosevic does not

keep his word, NATO air power will be

used against the Yugoslav military and

security forces.

I must tell you, as the senior member

in the minority on the Foreign Relations

Committee, I have mixed emotions

about Milosevic’s having agreed.

I believe he only understands force. I

believe that he is the problem. I believe

that, ultimately, force will have to be

used. And, quite frankly, I wish we had

just used this force.

Mr. President, this agreement has, at

least temporarily, averted NATO airstrikes

against Yugoslavia, which, as I

indicated, I strongly support. I support

them recognizing that they would have

endangered the lives of American military

personnel, which I do not take

lightly. But we must honestly and

forthrightly point out to the American

people that although the risk was low

for high casualties, it was high for

some casualties. No one wants war, and

this agreement may, in fact, begin to

lay the foundation for a political settlement

of the crisis in Kosovo. We

must understand, though, that war has

not been permanently averted in

Kosovo.

I would like to review the substance

of the agreement negotiated, whose

broad outlines are clear, but whose details

understandably remain to be hammered

out over the next several days.

Milosevic, according to the agreement,

must take several steps:

First, he must maintain a cease-fire

and scale back the presence of both the

special police, the so-called MUP, and

of the Yugoslav Army, or VJ, to February

1998 levels, dropping the regular

army presence from 18,000 to 12,500 and

the MUP from 11,000 to 6,500. I, and others,

I am sure, including Ambassador

Holbrooke, would have liked to have

seen it taken back further. But I acknowledge

that this was what was possible.

Second, Milosevic must sign an

agreement with the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe—

the so-called OSCE—to allow up to

2,000 ‘‘compliance verifiers’’ full access

on the ground in Kosovo to make sure

that Milosevic is keeping his promises.

Third, Milosevic must sign an agreement

with NATO to allow unarmed aircraft

to fly over Kosovo to verify compliance

with the cease-fire.

Fourth, he must begin serious negotiations

with the Kosovars by November

2, with a goal of giving Kosovo at

least autonomy within Serbia.

Fifth, he must allow complete access

for humanitarian organizations to deliver

assistance to the hundreds of

thousands of internally displaced persons

within Kosovo. These are the people

you see on television, huddled in

tents in the middle of fields and out in

the forests.

I believe it is unrealistic to think

that Milosevic can draw down the special

police and the Army units in

Kosovo to February levels by the time

the Serb-Kosovar negotiations begin on

November 2, but he will have to have

shown substantial movement in that

direction by that time.

Within a day or two, we can expect a

statement by Milosevic proposing a

timetable for negotiations with the

Kosovars. These negotiations are supposed

to be without preconditions. But

the United States has made it clear

that it expects Kosovo to regain a substantial

part of the autonomy within

Serbia that it lost in 1989. Although we

do not presume to negotiate for the

Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA, or

for Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, the moderate

Kosovar leader, that is the minimum

we expect.

Yesterday, Serbia’s President, a

Milosevic puppet, announced support

for elections to a Kosovo parliament, a

general amnesty, and the formation of

a Kosovar police force to maintain

order over the ethnic Albanian community

that comprises more than 90 percent

of Kosovo’s population.

President Clinton has described the

verification regime that Milosevic has

agreed to as intrusive. It gives the

OSCE verifiers a broad mandate, including

the authority to establish a

permanent presence in locations of

their choosing in Kosovo, to accompany

remaining Serb military units on

patrol, and to coordinate humanitarian

relief efforts. These verifiers would be

backed up by American U2 spy planes

and lower altitude P3 Orions and British

Canberra photo reconnaissance

planes to verify that compliance was

underway. The verifiers will be unarmed,

but NATO is putting together

what we refer to as an over-the-horizon

Quick Reaction Force, which will be

ready to intervene on short notice if

problems arise.

Let me explain what was meant by

that. There will be armed NATO military

on the ground—not in Kosovo, not

in Serbia—ready to react and cross the

border if, in fact, Milosevic goes back

to his ways of ethnic cleansing.

Although the basing of this Quick

Reaction Force has not yet been announced,

I am told that there is an increasing

likelihood that Macedonia,

rather than Hungary or Italy, will be

chosen as the location. Obviously, military

requirements must dictate the

basing decision, but in my view the

choice of Macedonia would provide a

needed political and psychological

boost for that small country, which

itself has a restive ethnic Albanian minority.

I feel our European allies should take

the lead on this Quick Reaction Force.

I have reason to believe that the

United Kingdom, which is in the best

position of our allies to play such a

role, may step up to the plate and take

on this responsibility.

Meanwhile, Milosevic has, as expected,

orchestrated the crisis to move

against domestic opposition within

Serbia. Democratic politicians in Serbia—

and there are some—have been

threatened. Many independent radio

stations have been forced off the air,

and dozens of university professors who

find Milosevic’s conduct abhorrent,

have been dismissed.

Diplomacy is not an easy art. Ambassador

Holbrooke, as I said earlier, is to

be congratulated for his persistence

and stamina in crafting this agreement.

As yet, no text has been released,

and many of the details remain

to be worked out in the coming days.

Although all Kosovar politicians,

from the nonviolent leader Dr. Rugova

to the KLA, vociferously maintain

their insistence on independence for

Kosovo, I believe most are prepared to

accept the return of the pre-1989 autonomy,

with the decision on the final status

to be deferred for several years.

My supposition is that between now

and November 2, U.S. diplomats will

work on a fresh draft that will be accepted

by Milosevic and the Kosovars

as the basis for negotiations. This will

not be an easy task.

Assuming that the Belgrade agreement

holds, where are we, and what are

the implications for U.S. policy?

In the short term, the Belgrade

agreement will be seen by some in the

Balkans as a victory for Milosevic,

since Kosovo will remain part of Serbia

and the KLA, temporarily at least, will

be denied its goal of independence. I

might add, though, that in the short

term, a NATO air campaign, most likely

would also have redounded to

Milosevic’s credit, since the Serbs’ first

reaction would have been to rally

round their flag.

It is important to note, however, that

if the Belgrade agreement is implemented,

Serbian sovereignty will be

undermined by the large international

presence with wide powers and, eventually,

I believe, by some sort of stipulation

regarding a decision on final political

status for Kosovo after a period of

several years.

As I have said many times on this

floor, I do not favor independence for

Kosovo. It would send the message in

the region that state boundaries should

be determined by ethnicity. The first

casualty of independence of Kosovo at

this moment would be the multiethnic,

multireligious, democratic Bosnia-

Herzegovina that underpins Dayton

and is the goal of American policy. I

believe it would also seriously destabilize

neighboring Macedonia.

Instead of independence, I have argued

for a status in Kosovo between

that of autonomy within Serbia and

independence. But that is for the parties

to work out. This could possibly

take the form of republic status within

Yugoslavia, but within a democratic

Yugoslavia, not the current plaything

of the thug named Milosevic.

That brings me to the fundamental

Balkan policy point that we should

cease regarding Milosevic as part of

the solution rather than as the problem

incarnate. There is simply no

chance for peace in the long term in

the region until Milosevic is replaced

by a democratic government in Belgrade

that is willing to grant cultural

and political rights to all of its citizens,

Serbs and non-Serbs alike, and to

respect the sovereignty of its neighbors.

I have no illusions that Belgrade is

full of politicians who read Jefferson

and Madison in their spare time. Nonetheless,

I do not think we have paid

adequate attention to the democratic

opposition that does exist. Let’s not

forget that a democratic coalition did

win control of 17 major city councils,

including that of Belgrade, in the elections

of November 1996. Even now, despite

many divisions within the democratic

ranks, there are significant elements

in Serbian politics, in the Serbian

Orthodox Church, among journalists,

and in academe that could and

should be assisted in a major way by

the United States of America.

For now, Milosevic has strengthened

his grip on power by suppressing much

of the opposition and spinning the news

to emphasize his defiance of the West

and NATO’s supposed backing down,

but that will be short lived. As Serbia’s

already pathetic economy worsens, opportunities

will reemerge for a broadbased

democratic opposition to challenge

Milosevic.

We should be patient while protecting

life.

We should lay the groundwork for

that day by continuing to insist that

the Serbian authorities lift the onerous

restrictions under which the independent

media chafe, by funding those independent

media, and by encouraging intensive

contact between democratic

Western political parties and trade

unions and their Serbian counterparts.

In my first visit to Serbia, when I

had a long meeting in Belgrade in 1993

with Milosevic, I indicated to him then

as forthrightly as I could when he

asked what I thought of him, I said to

him in the privacy of his office, ‘‘Mr.

President, I think you are a war criminal

and should be tried as such.’’

I then met with over 100 people in opposition

to Milosevic of all stripes,

some extreme nationalists in opposition

and some Democrats.

The only point I wish to make is that

there are roots for democratic growth

in Serbia, and we should seek them

out.

In the coming days, NATO must

watch Milosevic like a hawk and not be

afraid to act militarily if he fails to

fulfill the terms of the Belgrade agreement,

particularly the movement toward

reducing the numbers of his special

police in Kosovo and sending the

army back to its barracks and its

heavy weaponry into cantonments.

One must not forget, Mr. President,

who have been the big losers in the

tragedy of the last eight months. They

are the approximately one-third of the

Kosovar population whose ranks include

perhaps one thousand killed, over

three hundred thousand driven from

their homes, and over four hundred villages

destroyed.

All this in order for Milosevic, whose

legacy already includes hundreds of

thousands of Bosnian and Croatian

dead, to cling to power by once again

diverting the attention of the Serbian

people from the failure of his ignorant

and hopelessly inept domestic policies.

At least we can be thankful that if

the Belgrade agreement is implemented,

international relief supplies

should reach the hundreds of thousands

of displaced Kosovars, including many

living in the open, thereby preventing

massive fatalities this winter.

On the wider stage, NATO has set the

important precedent that in certain

circumstances it has the right to intervene

in the internal affairs of a European

state, without an explicit U.N. Security

Council authorization.

This is a big deal.

NATO has also made clear to Russia

that, in accordance with the 1997

NATO-Russia Founding Act, negotiated

by NATO Secretary General

Solana and the President of the United

States, Moscow has ‘‘a voice, not a

veto’’ over NATO policy. That has been

reemphasized here as well.

Nevertheless, partly because of Russian

objections and partly because of

the congenital Western European aversion

to using force to achieve political

ends, NATO waited several months too

long to create the credible threat necessary

to compel Milosevic to stop his

brutal repression notwithstanding U.S.

urging.

In effect, the delay enabled Milosevic

to complete the short-term destruction

of the KLA and the ethnic cleansing in

western and central Kosovo that he desired.

If similar crises arise in the future,

we should give ad hoc bodies like the

Contact Group one chance to get its

act together.

If it doesn’t, then we should, without

delay, go to NATO and call for resolute

action.

The kind of ethnic conflict we have

seen in Bosnia and Kosovo was specifically

mentioned in NATO’s so-called

Strategic Concept nearly seven years

ago as the prototype for threats to the

alliance in the post-Cold War era.

So this is not a surprise to NATO.

For that reason—not to mention the

thousands of lives that can be spared—

we must never again allow racist thugs

like Milosevic to carry out their outrages

while the alliance dawdles.

The Belgrade agreement on Kosovo is

a first step in the right direction. And

President Clinton should be complimented.

Its details need to be

fleshed out.

After they are we must brook no

more opposition from Milosevic on its

implementation. To use a domestic

American term, we must adopt a policy

of ‘‘zero tolerance’’ with the Yugoslav

bully.

Many of us had hoped that the mistakes

that enabled the Bosnian horrors

to take place would teach us a lesson.

Unfortunately, we have repeated

many of those errors and have thereby

allowed Milosevic and his storm troopers

to repeat their atrocities in Kosovo.

Twice is enough. There must not be a

third time.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

I particularly thank the distinguished

Senator from West Virginia,

my leader.